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ABSTRACT
We often point to the relative increase in the amount and sophistica-
tion of evaluations of visualization systems versus the earliest days
of the field as evidence that we are maturing as a field. I am not so
convinced. In particular, I feel that evaluations of visualizations, as
they are ordinarily performed in the field or asked for by reviewers,
fail to tell us very much that is useful or transferable about visu-
alization systems, regardless of the statistical rigor or ecological
validity of the evaluation. Through a series of thought experiments,
I show how our current conceptions of visualization evaluations can
be incomplete, capricious, or useless for the goal of furthering the
field, more in line with the “heroic age” of medical science than
the rigorous evidence-based field we might aspire to be. I conclude
by suggesting that our models for designing evaluations, and our
priorities as a field, should be revisited.
Index Terms: Human-centered computing—Visualization—
Visualization design and evaluation methods
1 INTRODUCTION
The late 18th century began what is often referred to as the “heroic
age” of medicine in the west [33]. Doctors would wade into bat-
tlefields or epidemics, roll up their sleeves, and prescribe mind-
boggling amounts of diuretics and purgatives and mercury, all the
while bleeding patients repeatedly. It was not particularly effective
medicine, but one of its effects was to move medical practice firmly
into the realm of the “expert.” Before, anybody could read their
Pliny the Elder, see that the cure for typhus was (say) a poultice of
goose grease and honey, and apply it (the patient would still proba-
bly die, but, you know). Now, even for minor illnesses, I needed to
consult with an expert to see exactly how much bloodletting needed
to be done, and at what tempo.
We’re firmly in the heroic age of information visualization. We
don’t have much of a theory, and what we have might be grossly
incorrect, but, by gum, we’re gonna get things done. Take two bar
charts and call me in the morning. What this has created is an odd
incentive where lots of us are heading out to work with “domain
experts,” make a new visualization system, do some sort of evalu-
ation of the system to confirm that it works, and then write it up.
Did they really need a new system? If they did, was it really worth
spending several months of back and forth meetings and prototyp-
ing and design work? These are the wrong questions for the heroic
age of data. Our lack of strong theoretical unpinnings, combined
with our emphasis on techne (“knowing-how”) rather than episteme
(“knowing-that”) [29] means that our incentives for evaluating visu-
alization systems are often quite perverse and fail to tell the broader
community much of interest. Most troubling, like the blood-letting
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and purgatives and diuretics of old, our lack of solid epistemologi-
cal foundation mean that we can remain in error about the efficacy
of our work for long periods of time.
In this setting, I believe that our current practices around evalua-
tions do not suffice to reliably assess the contribution of any partic-
ular work to the field. I will attempt to convince the reader of this
ontological insufficiency through a series of thought experiments.
Note that is largely a claim about logical necessity and sufficiency,
and so these thought experiments may or may not have much to do
with empirical lived reality. I acknowledge that determining how of-
ten we fall into the particular pitfalls I will bring up is an empirical
project I am unwilling to undertake for this paper. Also note that
this argument is mostly about evaluations conducted as part of de-
sign studies or other evaluations of visualization systems. Graphical
perception work, sensitivity analyses, and other parts of empiricism
are out of scope (although I do think that some of the issues I raise
could apply to our practices around these sorts of studies as well).
1.1 A Sketch of the Argument
The procedural techne focus of knowledge-formation (as well as
our generally positivist epistemology [25]) in visualization design
extends also to how we design our evaluations. Tamara Mun-
zner [26] suggests an injective matching procedure from the type of
contribution we intend to make and the resulting appropriate forms
of evaluation and evidence. Lam et al. [23] similarly divide visual-
ization evaluations into seven core types with accepted forms, mea-
sures, and analyses. These procedural approaches to visualization
evaluation suggest to me the following tacit premises:
1. The kind of work we will do to build our visualization system
suggests the kind of evaluation we ought to undertake, as well
as which metrics we should collect, a priori.
2. This evaluation can succeed or fail in illustrating the utility of
our system by our chosen metrics.
3. The success or failure of the evaluation is diagnostic or infor-
mative to the contribution of our work to the field.
These premises are at some level vacuously true. For instance,
we do not need to finish the implementation of a newly developed
algorithm to know that, say, a Tarot card reading would be a poor fit
for evaluating the algorithm’s average run time compared to a quan-
titative performance evaluation (except under very specific circum-
stances [24]), and that this quantitative evaluation could produce
either good or bad news for the algorithm compared to the current
state of the art, and that a paper with this good or bad news would
help me judge the contribution of the algorithm to the literature in
a more precise way than a paper with no such information. Nev-
ertheless, I think we adhere too strongly to these premises when
considering our evaluative work in the contexts of design studies.
In particular, I maintain:
1. A visualization system can be “good” (in that it can succeed
by the reasonable metrics we laid out in our evaluation) and
still be largely uninteresting to the field.
2. Conversely, a visualization system can be “bad” (from the
same evaluative standpoint) and be very interesting.
3. Therefore, our evaluations (even ones that are a good “fit”
for our intended contribution) may only tell us whether some-
thing is “good” or “bad” rather than “interesting” or “uninter-
esting” (and even then only in a narrow and stochastic way).
It follows from the above that the outcomes of evaluations, even
appropriately-designed evaluations, may be uninformative for as-
sessing visualization systems from a research perspective. Evalua-
tions, even well-designed evaluations that follow established norms
and rules for the sort of systems work we did, are not magical pro-
cedures that lend the imprimatur of seriousness or utility to our vi-
sualization papers, and we as researchers or reviewers should give
them weight only insofar as answer our questions about the work in
a rhetorically convincing way.
2 THE MULTIPLE WORLDS OF VISUALIZATION EVALUATION
In order to disentangle the fit and outcome of an evaluation from the
research contribution of the visualization artifact being evaluated, I
will rely on a form of thought experiment that Daniel Dennett calls
an “intuition pump” [8]. In this case what I will be doing is taking a
simple premise about which we have a similar set of intuitions and
adding increasing layers of complexity or absurdity to see where
our intuitions begin to shift. Again, this is a thought experiment:
the practical likelihood of any particular outcome here is sort of
a red herring (much as it is sort of besides the point to suggest if
Schrdinger’s cat is a calico or a tortoiseshell). What I hope to do
instead with these scenarios is to cast doubt about many of our ex-
isting beliefs about user evaluations, e.g. that “good” outcomes vis-
-vis metrics like user performance, user satisfaction, or analytical
insight, are indicative of a visualization system of research interest.
That prelude out of the way, let’s begin with the following
prompt, right out of the heroic age of visualization:
You are a visualization researcher running a research lab. Your
lab regularly submits to top-tier conferences like IEEE VIS or CHI
or what have you. You’ve just been offered the opportunity to work
with a group of cancer researchers who have been struggling to
understand their data. After a long period of collaboration and
iterative design sessions, you come up with a visualization system,
CancerVis. Using your system, the researchers discover something
that leads them to develop a cure for cancer. There’s a press junket,
a Nobel Prize or two, and the scientists make sure to thank you in
their acceptance speeches.
Meanwhile, you’ve had a student or two working at evaluating
your system via your favorite evaluative method (quantitative, qual-
itative, insight-based, whatever floats your boat). Today, you’ve just
received an email with the ominous subject heading “RE: Study Re-
sults.”
Let’s pause here for a moment. Right now, given only the infor-
mation in the story I’ve just told you, think about the truth or falsity
of the following statements (subjective though they might be):
1. CancerVis is a good visualization system.
2. A paper about CancerVis deserves to be accepted at a high tier
visualization conference or journal.
3. The visualization community can learn from CancerVis.
Jarke van Wijk, in his consequentialist assessment of visualiza-
tion [36], would seem to produce the inescapable conclusion that
proposition 1 is true: millions of lives saved is certainly worth what-
ever cost in design/training/adoption of a team of a few scientists
and designers. Unless you’re extremely uncharitable with my story
above (and we will be later, don’t worry), it’s hard to argue for any-
thing other than our system’s positive utility.
Propositions 2 and 3 seem dicier to me. I’ve told you nothing
about the actual CancerVis system. I have no idea what, if anything,
was new about it. It’s possible that any half-competent designer
would have produced a system just as good (or even better) than
CancerVis. It’s possible that your methods and designs were so
shoddy that they should only be brought up in academic circles as a
warning about what not to do. I just don’t know. It’s likewise hard
to say if a paper based on CancerVis deserves to be accepted in a
top-tier venue, just in the same way that doctors don’t get a Lancet
article every time they treat a patient who doesn’t die. I don’t know,
a priori, whether CancerVis has any lessons that would advance
the field, which is allegedly one of the main things that academic
papers are supposed to do.
I would like the clarify here that my question about “deserves”
is on the wrong side of an is/ought distinction. I know that I would
feel like a pretty big jerk if I didn’t let the people who helped cure
cancer at least come to the conference and give a talk. So I’m pretty
sure that a CancerVis paper would, in practice, almost certainly be
accepted if it were pitched the right way (it’s a hell of a “broader
impacts” statement, at least). But right now, without further infor-
mation, I don’t know if the process of making and deploying Can-
cerVis generated generalizable knowledge for the field of visualiza-
tion.
Given this current state of affairs, let’s open that “RE: Study Re-
sults” email. We’ll be exploring different parallel worlds, some of
which are mutually exclusive (and some admittedly fantastical). Af-
ter each possible world, I would charge the reader to reflect on how
their initial conceptions about the system and its benefit to the field
have (or have not) changed. Here’s the first such world:
2.1 The Unique System
The students running your evaluation found that CancerVis beats
all of the other systems in this space totally out of the water. That
was easy enough to show, since there were no other systems in this
space. The problem that it solved is idiosyncratic to your specific set
of domain collaborators. “And we’re out of the game,” said the lead
scientist. “We cured cancer so we’re all going to retire to tropical
islands and live it up. Have fun with your scatterplots or whatever,”
they continue, packing their belongings into a cardboard box while
checking out yacht prices online. Those oncology research labs that
remain have dramatically different data problems that your system
can’t address.
By construction, it seems like CancerVis is a good system. But
it is also, by construction, unclear if the VIS community would ac-
tually learn anything from it. It solves one problem, and did so
with such definitiveness that nobody has to solve the problem again.
And, to extend the medical metaphor a bit more, it’s a “zebra” prob-
lem, not a “horse” problem [32]. So why would anybody in the field
consult a paper about CancerVis paper? What use would they get
out of it? CancerVis is nice, and the designers deserve all sorts of
accolades in this particular version of the world, but I’m not certain
an academic paper is the right carrot for this work. Or perhaps I’m
being too negative, and the fact that you followed a design proce-
dure that led to a good outcome is itself good to know. Let’s take
that situation to the extreme in the next world we visit.
2.2 The Obvious System
The prior situation was perhaps a little unfair. Given the level of
abstraction involved in visual analytics task analysis, it’s unlikely
that the problem CancerVis solved was just totally out of left field
and has nothing that could be transferred to a different problem. So
let’s move to a different world:
The students running your evaluation found that the system
works just fine. But, then again, it ought to work fine. Your stu-
dents read a popular visualization textbook and then followed the
procedures in it to the letter. “We had categorical data with associ-
ated aggregate quantitative data, so I used a bar chart for that bit,”
says the main designer. “We had time series data so we used a line
chart,” continues another. As a test, you give the task requirements
and sample data to your undergraduate visualization class as a de-
sign exercise. They all came up with designs almost identical to
CancerVis, except for one group in the back who went with a 3D
pie chart where each slice is a word cloud, but you think they might
have been messing with you.
Now, we’ve sort of got the opposite problem from the Unique
System. Here, our problem was a little too easy, such that almost
everybody with a perfunctory understanding of visualization design
could tackle it. It’s good to know that what we think works actually
works (especially since our basis for believing such things is often
rather thin [21]), so the generalizable knowledge we get from this
would seem to be, largely, to keep on trucking.
If so, there would then seem to be diminishing academic returns
for such papers, except in the aggregate, as a way to perform meta-
analysis and see what accepted design practice looks like. Wemight
remember Alexander Fleming, for instance, for discovering peni-
cillin, but we likely don’t remember the hundredth or thousandth
person to prescribe penicillin. We would only seem to need to know
about it in a man-bites-dog situation: when the things we expect to
work from our standard design processes stop working (say, what-
ever the metaphorical equivalent of drug resistance is). Let’s visit
one such world next:
2.3 The Worse Than Baseline System
The students running your evaluation have found that the main in-
sight that led to the breakthrough discovery would have shown up in
an Excel pivot table. In fact, in their evaluation of the system, they
found that people were much faster in finding it with Excel than with
the bespoke CancerVis system. Your collaborators were just about
to try tinkering with Excel more, but your initial planning meeting
lo those many months ago interrupted them, and they figured you
would know what you were doing. Extrapolating from that perfor-
mance data, it’s possible that the intervention of your lab delayed
the cure for cancer by months.
Yikes! Now we’ve reversed the sign of that utility equation in
Van Wijk’s Value of Visualization assessment I mentioned to above.
We showed up, did (presumably) rational things, and it led to a
worse outcome than if we hadn’t intervened at all. We didn’t help
people. CancerVis is a bad system. But here a post-mortem might
be useful. Why was it bad? Was it too complicated? Poorly de-
signed? If the message of the CancerVis paper is “I personally am
incompetent and didn’t know what I’m doing” then maybe that’s
less valuable for the field, but if the message is “we did all the right
things and still got this bad outcome” then we’ve got something
here.
I should note, however, that I had to set up this world very care-
fully just so this assessment of failure was even possible. There’s a
baseline system (Excel) to compare against, an initial plan of attack
that was derailed, and a task resulting in an insight that was mod-
eled in sufficient detail to use as a yardstick. In most visualization
system evaluations, we have no idea whether or not we’re in this
world, or one like it. Our collaborators’ problems are idiosyncratic
enough that we don’t have a baseline to test against, and what is
meant by “success” is nebulous enough that it’s hard to pin down.
It should perhaps worry you that we almost never test against visu-
alization “placebos” in this way. We often have no way of knowing
if what we’re doing is any more or less helpful than an 18th century
doctor proscribing daily purgatives.
2.4 The Detestable System
The students running your evaluation found that your system works
fine, but your users hated using it the entire time. Un-intuitive in-
terfaces, hostile design choices, and a color scheme that led to mi-
graines in some of your users after just a few minutes. Your student
collected some qualitative feedback, and a lot of it is just direct
threats of violence against you personally. That being said, they
did perform better with your system compared to the baselines.
This particular world might be the most far-fetched of all. Due
to the demand characteristics [28] of how we run our experiments
(where we often form close friendships or working relationships
with our collaborators and have mutual stake in the others’ suc-
cesses) as well as the good old sunk cost fallacy, there is a pres-
sure to please the experimenter and give positive feedback even if
the system is awful [7], or to persevere with less than ideal sys-
tems to keep a collaborative relationship alive. As with the prior
world, I would ask you to consider how many things would have
to be true (outspoken collaborators operating in an environment of
radical candor, mixed methods quantitative and qualitative methods
against existing baselines, etc.) in order for you to ever find out that
you were in a world where people really didn’t like the thing that
you built. But suppose we were in such a world, where it’s clear
that, from a human-centered design standpoint, we did almost ev-
erything wrong. And yet, the users of our tool did cure cancer. And
the quantitative feedback does seem to show some performance ben-
efits for our system. Given all of that, do you care that your users
hated it? The unfriendly nature of your design might make it an
uphill battle to productize or sell the system, and perhaps tricky to
maintain a working relationship with the oncology team after the
CancerVis project is over, but for the purpose of “getting a paper or
two” out of the thing, you could argue that this negative qualitative
data simply doesn’t matter.
This seems like a counter-intuitive conclusion to me. The Kan-
tian in me would say that performing human-centered design work
is an end in and of itself. And I would expect that, as a general
rule, a human-friendly system would be “better” by most quanti-
tative analytical metrics (engagement, willingness to explore, etc.)
than a functionally equivalent system that is human-hostile. But
what should I do with these particular results, other than writing yet
another paper about the existence of a preference/performance gap?
2.5 The Serendipitous System
Now let’s jump away from that sad realm to a different parallel
world, and open that email up again:
The students running your evaluation found that your system was
pretty good at the tasks that were initially given to you, but that
those tasks had almost nothing to do with how the breakthrough
came about. The main insight was found almost totally by chance.
Your collaborators performed precisely the right sequence of ac-
tions in precisely the right order. If they had set some sliders dif-
ferently, say, there’s a chance they would not have found the key
insight at all.
There is a concept in philosophy called “moral luck,” [37] where
our intuitions about praise and blame in moral actions seem to be
partially reliant on chance. For instance, the criminal penalties for
attempted murder are often lower than for “actual” murder, even if
the actions and intents of the person doing the violence were the
same. Here we seemed to have lucked out.
It’s not clear, however, what we’ve learned from this system,
other than “sometimes you luck out.” Now, there are ways of de-
signing to promote this kind of serendipity [1, 34], but that doesn’t
seem to be what happened here. And what that means is that if we
were evaluating a system based on its overall benefit, we’d get radi-
cally different answers depending on the luck of our participants.
There’s a sort of related issue here in that nothing succeeds like
success (or, more negatively, the rich get richer). The people who
are most likely to generate their own analytical luck are highly mo-
tivated people who are willing to give you the benefit of the doubt
and spend lots of time with you and your project. Those people
would self-select for visualization collaborators with a proven track
record of success. So successful visualization labs are perhaps more
able to self-select (or “winnow” down [31]) successful domain col-
laborators who are more likely to get something of value out of
whatever system they are given, no matter the quality, which means
that the visualization lab gets even more successful, and so on and
so on. How important is first mover advantage in a field like visual-
ization?
But matters of inequality of accolade distribution aside, at the
very least I would hope that this version of the world would indi-
cate that an anecdotal incident of a successful use of a particular
visualization system may not be a strong case for its general utility.
I’m sure at least some of the people given mercury and blood letting
did get better (if for no other reason than their bodies were able to
fight off the disease by themselves despite the “help” of their physi-
cian). But one healthy patient does not mean we know what we’re
doing. One happy analyst does not mean we’ve built a good system.
Maybe we were just lucky.
2.6 The Super Serendipitous System
A natural objection to the world I just presented is that the designers
built a system that “let accidents happen,” and afforded the kind of
exploration that made the insight possible. That, you might think,
is at the very least evidence that they were doing something right.
So let’s move on to another, highly related parallel world:
The students running your evaluation have found that the main
insight was found due to series of errors in an earlier version of
your system. It made a bar that was supposed to be blue render as
red, which the collaborators found odd enough to investigate. Then
the system crashed to desktop, which gave the scientists some time
to think about what would happen if that bar actually were red.
This led them down a path that unravelled the whole problem. If
you had done a better job at software engineering, then they might
have never found anything worth talking about.
Now moral luck is really at play here. Your group did a bad
job that just so happened to work out. Your system was sort of
the equivalent of the (somewhat apocryphal) story of Fleming for-
getting to clean up the bread mold in his lab. I’m sure these sorts
of errors happen all the time, especially over the course of itera-
tive development, but it’s not clear what all I’m supposed to learn
from any of this. “Hey, sometimes things just work out, despite our
actions” is not really a contribution statement I can do much with.
CancerVis, in this world, would be an interesting anecdote, but I’m
not sure it would make a good model for anything.
3 DISCUSSION
To me, these multiple worlds produce an inescapable conclusion. If
I’m an academic, and I’m supposed to be assessing a paper based
on its academic contribution to the field: Whether your system
“works,” in the sense of being well-designed or useful or well-
received, might be the least interesting thing about it.
It’s nice if it worked to solve a problem. And it’s admirable if
you took the time to confirm that people liked it. And I deeply sus-
pect that soliciting iterative feedback and testing different designs
and features will help you do a better job at engineering the dang
thing. But from an academic perspective of contributing to the field,
there’s a good chance that I don’t (or shouldn’t) care. I am mainly
interested in the answers to these questions (or ones very similar to
them):
1. What does your system tell me about visualization design?
2. What does your system tell me about people?
3. What does your system tell me about what we should do next?
In short, what do I know that I didn’t before, and what should
I do now that I know it? In the worlds above there are potentially
answers to all of those questions. But they are very different an-
swers depending on the world we are in, and the type of analysis
we did. The existence of an evaluation per se does not help me
narrow things down, or automatically strengthen the contribution
of the paper in a rigorous way. Nor is it necessarily a question of
the “fit” of evaluative methods to kind of work we did (after all, we
did roughly the same work in every single parallel world). It seems
to be more about the fit of the evaluative methods and the kinds of
things we want to say.
In other words, the “standard” design study procedure of find-
ing a domain collaborator, building a tool to solve their problem,
evaluating the tool, and then writing a paper about it, doesn’t neces-
sarily advance the field, even if the domain experts had interesting
problems and there is some empirical evidence that the thing we
built was beneficial via some metric. It might be useful for us per-
sonally (or even organizationally) to build experience engineering
software, discover hitherto unknown design pitfalls, and meet new
people with new kinds of data, but this design study pipeline might
not move the field forward one iota.
3.1 Counter-Arguments & Case Studies
The perfect is famously an enemy of the good. An uncharitable
reading of my thought experiments would suggest that not only
must an evaluation be well-designed for me to take it seriously, but
that it must be well-designed across an arbitrary number of possi-
ble worlds, some of which are quite unlikely and adversarial. While
it’s true that I wouldn’t say no to analyses that can survive across
the multiverse (as in Dragicevic et al. [10]), my thought experiment
was more designed to illustrate ways in which a properly performed
evaluation can still fail to teach us something useful as a field. Nat-
ural counterpoints to this argument are that 1) in an inductive sense,
just because we didn’t necessarily learn something useful doesn’t
mean that we didn’t potentially learn something useful (who could
predict which papers at which conferences will win something like
an IEEE VIS Test of Time award, after all) and 2) we may not have
learned anything useful from one study per se, but we might learn
something from studies in the aggregate.
I think these objections have a similar form: that we should be
accepting of large numbers of papers with the expected value of
each paper in terms of generating new knowledge for the field be-
ing potentially quite small. In none of the parallel words I bring up,
after all, was the evaluation completely uninformative. We uncov-
ered some new information from each of them, even if the informa-
tion wasn’t particularly actionable (“we screwed up and it worked
out anyway”) or novel (“if you follow a similar design process to
everybody else, you’ll get similar results”).
The question would then seem to hinge on whether we learned
enough in each world to “deserve” a paper (moving through the
stages of grief for our evaluations from denial to anger to bargain-
ing in record time). To correct my earlier statement, I will mention
that a doctor probably learns something every time they treat a pa-
tient, but they don’t always learn enough that they go shouting from
the rooftops about it (although I should point out that most hospi-
tals do hold morbidity and mortality conferences when patients die).
Doctors do, however, write lots of case studies. I think it is in the
analogy to case studies where we can explore this counter-argument
to the fullest.
The history of psychology and medicine is incomplete without
a gallery of influential patients. Stories of Phineas Gage [6] and
Genie the “feral child” [5] are told in undergraduate courses to il-
lustrate foundational points about how the mind works. Patients
like Alexis St. Martin (whose recovery after a wound left a perma-
nent fistula that could be used to study in great detail the workings
of the digestive system [2]) and Sadao Yoshida, who voluntarily
consumed parasitic roundworm eggs in order to confirm hypothe-
ses about their life-cycle [38], were able further the cause of com-
mon scientific knowledge through self-sacrifice. Those extremes
aside, even today, case studies on single patients are ubiquitous in
medicine.
At a glance, a typical design study is a lot more like a case study.
The evaluation may say n = 500 Mechanical Turk workers or what
have you, but it’s still fundamentally an n = 1 study with the “pa-
tient” being our collaborators as a gestalt and our “treatments” be-
ing the design(s) we gave them. The evaluations we perform at the
end are perhaps not meant to answer generalizable questions about
the field, but are really just diagnostic tools like a stethoscope or a
thermometer: we’re just “checking the vitals” on our patient to see
if our treatment helped them our not.
In the case study regime, the research contribution of any indi-
vidual paper might be rather small. They are “anecdata” that are
meant to be either a) existence proofs (“The patient presented with
symptoms that were unlike any I have seen, which is evidence of
a new disease”) b) hypothesis creation steps (“I recommended this
course of treatment for the patient and it seemed to work, we should
study this in more detail to confirm”) or c) the raw material for later
meta-analyses (“I looked at a hundred patients that were given a
new treatment and they seemed to have better outcomes than oth-
ers”).
If we are in this regime, then my suggestions that design study
evaluations don’t provide us with much in the way of generalizable
knowledge is perfectly fine (or at least generally okay). Individual
design studies papers are not meant to be of much interest, but packs
of them together, analyzed in aggregate, will tell us new things. We
have as a field begun to undertake these sort of systematic reviews.
We have collections and browsers of the dozens to hundreds of tech-
niques or systems for visualizing trees [30], texts [22], time [35],
and uncertainty [17]. Perhaps more to the point, we have also be-
gun to collate evaluations of designs, either in general [23], or in
specific cases of glyphs [12] and uncertainty visualization [15].
I have two responses to this point of view, one flippant and one
more involved. The more flippant one is, if a design study is just
meant to be a point example, why bother evaluating at all? If you’re
giving up on using the evaluation to generate generalizable research
knowledge, but just (in a metaphorical sense), to confirm that the
patient recovered (or at least didn’t die), why spend so much time
and effort on evaluating, or critiquing evaluations, or demanding
them as reviewers? Early influential papers (like those for treemaps,
say [18]) didn’t have any user evaluations, so why do we think
we need them now? As existence proofs of new domains or new
potential designs all we need is just some evidence that they do
something, and then we can rely on future work to figure out if
that something is useful, or consistently useful, or better than some
other design.
My other response to the medical case study metaphor is that if
we’re meant to be using case studies as anecdotes for later meta-
analysis, we sure don’t write them in a way that would be useful for
that purpose. Quantitative studies still only occur in a minority of
VIS papers [13], we only infrequently share our results in an open
and accessible way [14], and, if my experience with uncertainty
visualization meta-analysis [15] is any indication, we are wildly in-
consistent with what we measure and how we measure it in the first
place. These idiosyncrasies mean that I’m afraid we can’t just paper
over deficiencies in how we evaluate now by appealing to some po-
tential research contribution in the future: at the very least it seems
rude to future generations of researchers to make them have to pick
through the rubble of our current practices to find the few apples-to-
apples comparisons they can salvage.
In summary, there’s nothing wrong with writing a case study.
They are often interesting to read, teach us about a new domain
we might not have heard of (I suppose these are the “new disease
spotted” equivalents), and are breeding grounds for new designs.
I would however ask for two reforms: 1) that we be clear-eyed
and honest when we design our evaluations and write them up: we
aren’t setting out to confirm universal truths about human reactions
to visualizations, we’re just showing that our design seems to do
what we claimed it does, which may not require any sort of quanti-
tative evaluation at all and 2) that we make our papers “talk to each
other” better: use standard metrics when we can, avoid the idiosyn-
cratic and often impenetrable “task analyses” that generate the n= 1
paper experimental conditions for our work, and rely on open data
practices to make meta-analyses possible, easier, and more useful.
3.2 What is to be Done?
Here I revisit my initial metaphor of visualization’s “heroic age.” To
me our current heroic era of visualization is characterized similarly
to the heroic age of medicine:
An emphasis on individual herculean actions by individual ac-
tors. Many of our design study papers focus on how difficult it was
to get the right data in the right format, or to create the right de-
signs, or to foster the right sort of collaborations. The assumption
in such papers, tacit or explicit, is that other labs or ways of thinking
would not have produced the same positive results. Our visualiza-
tion “heroes” are often some combination of clinician, evangelist,
and engineer: the first to intervene in specific domains hitherto un-
reached by academic visualization, the first to crack the puzzle of
the “right” way to collaborate with this strangers, or the first to
make the “right” kinds of tools. As our field matures, we will need
other ways of evaluating our contributions other than these appeals
to novelty and individual insight.
A lack of “safe” placebos and interventions. Many of the medi-
cal interventions after the end of the heroic age were equally as (in-
)effective as mercury and bloodletting, but, e.g., hydrotherapy and
fad diets and other such placebo treatments were much less harsh
on the system than weeks of purgatives, and so were preferred as
interventions by patients and clinicians alike. A century or so af-
ter the start of heroic age, Flint speaks of a 19th century turn from
“heroic practice” to “conservative medicine” [11]) that is cognizant
of the size, scope, and potential disruption of the intervention, favor-
ing the safer intervention when possible. By contrast, our usual in-
tervention (the design and implementation of bespoke visualization
tools through iterative and collaborative design) is tremendously ex-
pensive in terms of time, energy, and effort. Making an entirely new
tool I view as a very radical act in many other scientific fields; in
visualization and HCI it seems to be the norm.
A lack of theoretical correctives. Doctors of the heroic age
like Benjamin Rush did not lack theory. Their actions were often
strongly situated within humorism, at that point a theory with over
2,000 years of application to medicine from Hippocrates on down.
What was lacking, in my view, was a willingness to revisit this the-
ory (rather than for instance claiming that a patient died after blood-
letting because we didn’t bleed them enough), the epistemological
tools to create new theory, and the empirical and rhetorical tools to
supplant the old theory with the new (here I spare a prayer for Ig-
naz Semmelweis, who was unable to convince his colleagues of the
importance of antiseptic handwashing, and died in an asylum after
widespread mockery [3]).
If we really are in the heroic age of visualization, and our focus
is on repeated practice and intervention rather than theorizing and
verification, then much of our systems work is not going to tell
us much, with or without an evaluation. If we want to focus on
evaluations in our work then we need to correct one or more of the
potential problems of our heroism:
Wewrite too many systems and design study papers andwe need
scholastic and academic rewards for visualization design that
are not conference papers. Again, doctors don’t get a top tier pa-
per in a medical journal every time they treat a patient who doesn’t
die. This is a generalization of course, but we as an academic
field seem to have somewhat similar design patterns and principles
for building and evaluating visualization systems (or at least ideal-
ized forms of these practices embodied in influential papers such as
Munzner et al. and Sedlmair et al. [27, 31]). If this is the case, then
“we followed the process and it worked out” is important to know in
a general way (just as it is important to know that the sun continued
to rise in the east today), but it isn’t really enough to hang our hats
on (although if we see that the process isn’t working, that is useful
information). Yet I acknowledge the practical utility of doing these
design studies in academia: to build personal or institutional know-
how, to provide deliverables to keep collaborators happy, to stake
one’s claim to expertise in a particular data domain, etc.
I agree that we should reward practical design work, encourage
grad students to build systems and hone their design skills, and
record what systems we built and why (so we can perform meta-
analyses or develop best practices), but there has to be a reward
structure for doing this other than building hundreds or thousands of
independent visualizations systems, each with independent, largely
un-comparable evaluations, all of which are published as 8-10 page
conference papers. Before I feel comfortable suggesting altering
incentives here (one unpalatable solution to this problem would be
to just simply reject every design study paper that doesn’t teach
me anything useful for visualization), I think getting these alterna-
tive reward structures in order is important. For instance, we could
make more of a habit in the field of publishing our design study
work in the journals or venues of our domain collaborators (after
all, if we claimed to have helped our users, then we should tell the
rest of the domain that so they can be helped as well). Or we could
encourage the building of personal or lab-wide “portfolios” as with
art or design schools rather than more traditional paper-based CVs
(and evaluate students and colleagues on this basis rather than just
paper count).
We are too concerned with the “success” of our designs and lack
adequate appreciation for failures, or concern with alternatives to
our own efforts. We need more equivalents of “visualization
placebos,” and greater willingness to detect (and report on) our
design failures. We assume that, as visualization designers with ex-
pertise, all of our interventions will eventually be successful (maybe
after enough design iterations). This may or may not be the case,
but there’s often no way to tell. We should be willing to cut our
losses and report out on what didn’t work. And a “loss” here may
have little to do with how a system is received or functioned: as
researchers we presumably seek out systems work with domain
collaborators with the goal of solving mutual interesting research
questions. It’s possible that we completed the project having sat-
isfied the domain scientists, but without having learned very much
in the way of new, generalizable knowledge for our home disci-
pline. Alternative venues to showcase our “failures” such as the
Fail Fest workshop (https://failfest.github.io/) might pro-
vide some ways to showcase these missteps, but I think we should
do more to actively seek out potential points of failure in our own
research. This could involve adversarial analyses (the equivalent
of visualization “red teams,” perhaps) post-paper publication post
mortems (how many visualization creators of one-off systems for
domain experts check in to see if their collaborators are still using
them 1, 2 or 10 years down the line?), or re-analyses and replica-
tions of our results by other groups.
We’ve gotten too far ahead of ourselves, and we need more theo-
retical underpinnings, meta-analyses, and codifications of stan-
dard practices before we do more practical work. A quantitative
evaluation could tell me which of the four humours was most ef-
fective in treating the flu, but it would be less useful in telling me
that the whole regime of the humorism is medically unsound, or
propose the germ theory of disease as an alternative. By the time
we’ve gotten to the treatment (or the visualization design), we’re so
far removed from theory that there’s not much we can do to correct
theoretical errors. This is not to say that all of our design studies are
useless for theory, or that we would make progress if we resorted
purely to navel-gazing. Rather, I claim that the default shape of de-
sign study (work with the domain collaborator, do iterative design,
do a post-hoc evaluation of the thing you built) won’t necessarily
move the needle. If we were serious about theoretical work then
we should design systems with a concrete theory in mind to em-
body or to test. For instance, setting out at the start of a project
to make an explicitly feminist [9], anarchist [19], or algebraically
compliant [20] design. Or we might have to design to falsify or at-
tack theories with “reductio ad absurdum” designs [4] specifically
meant to address common refrains of design best practices [16].
4 CONCLUSION
I do not intend this thought experiment to produce the conclusion
that we should not evaluate our visualizations, or even that we are
evaluating too much. Rather, I would charge the reader to consider
if our evaluations reliably answer interesting questions, and what
would need to change in the way we evaluate (or how we think of
the visualization field conceptually) for this reliability to increase.
What do our evaluations tell us about what we’ve made and how
does that knowledge help us advance the field? How do we move
out of the heroic age?
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